Grey-box Mechanism Design in Peer-to-Peer Cooperative Networking by Simon G. M. Koo
Grey-box Mechanism Design in Peer-to-Peer
Cooperative Networking
Simon G. M. Koo
Department of Mathematics and Computer Science
University of San Diego
San Diego, CA 92110
Email: koo@sandiego.edu
I. INTRODUCTION
The foundation of most peer-to-peer (P2P) systems is
based on the contribution of resources from peers and such
contribution plays a signiﬁcant role in the efﬁciency and
performance of the system. A lot of efforts have been made to
avoid freeriding and tragedy of the commons [1], two of the
major problems in P2P networks. In a distributed environment,
where users, represented by automated agents, may have
disparate interests on their own, a mechanism, or protocol,
for negotiation and compromise on how to share resources
and maintaining fairness will be a critical component for the
overall success of the system. Here we use the term protocol
exclusively for the “negotiation and compromise” mechanisms
adopted by a P2P system, which is distinctive from a network
protocol, such as TCP/IP, or an application-layer protocol for
communications between processes. In the rest of the paper,
we shall use the term protocol and mechanism interchangeably.
We shall ﬁrst deﬁne a few terminologies before the dis-
cussion continues. Agents are generally considered to be
electronic entities representing there (human) clients in the
process of negotiation, and they will act on behalf of their
clients and bind to the protocol given.
A protocol speciﬁes the rules on what deals agents can make
and what information one should reveal in order for others to
make decisions. Once the protocol is laid out, it will be up to
the agents to choose an appropriate strategy and interact with
other agents. It should be noted that agents merely execute
the negotiation – it is the clients who design and propose the
strategies for the agents. If the client doesn’t propose one, its
agents will follow a default strategy proposed by the protocol.
As the goal of each P2P system differs, they will need a
different protocol to achieve them. Mechanism design, a term
ﬁrst used in economics, attempts to implement mechanisms to
maximize social welfare, or as deﬁned in [2], an attempt to
implement “desired social choice in a strategic setting.” As in
game theory, mechanism design generally assumes that agents
(and clients) will act rationally and are trying to maximize their
own utilities [3].
II. INCENTIVE MECHANISM DESIGN
Mechanism design has to deal with every conﬁguration of
agents’ utility functions. For tractability, we can assume there
is a known set of all possible utility functions, and each agent
will be assigned a type based on which functions it is currently
using. Knowing the type of other agents can improve one’s
decision process which in turns provide more possibilities for
one to reach a better choice. However, it may not be beneﬁcial
for an agent to reveal its own type, or worse, an agent may be
better off if it lies about its type. A mechanism is considered
to be incentive compatible if agents have incentive to reveal
their types. In other words, the best strategy for any agents in
an incentive compatible system is to reveal their true identity
and follow the protocol.
There has been various attempts to design a P2P system
that is incentive compatible [4], [5], [6], [7], [8]. Among
them, BitTorrent [9] is one of the most popular P2P-based
ﬁle distribution systems that is incentive-compatible. It uses
a “tit-for-tat” mechanism to reward peers that contribute
more of their capacity in assisting the distribution process.
However, these protocols either suffer from a high cost of
reputation management, or a course granularity in classifying
client types. In [10] and [11], we have proposed an incentive
compatible mechanism for neighbor-selection that does not
require maintenance of reputation, and a “seeing-is-believing”
resource sharing mechanism where the best strategy for clients
is to comply with the protocol and contribute as much as they
can.
III. MECHANISM WITH HUMAN INTERVENTION
It is until recently that stocks and other derivatives trading
have been deploying automated trading agents to represent
the clients. These agents are programmed with client-deﬁned
strategies, and react to the market based on their prediction or
other modeling outcome. The upside of these agents include
fast responses (to a short arbitrage opportunity, for example)
and do not make emotional decisions. An agent will follow
its strategy regardless of how many times it has failed in the
past, but the same thing may not be said about human traders.
Even though trading agents have these advantages, they
are also incapable to make adjustments1 or take into account
other features that are not described in their model. For
large investment banks and hedge funds, trading without the
supervision of human being is very risky, so many automated
1We consider adaptive strategy a ﬁxed strategy in the sense that the updating
and learning algorithm is ﬁxed.P￿e￿e￿r￿ ￿ t￿o￿  ￿ P￿e￿e￿r￿
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Fig. 1. “Grey-box” decision with human intervention.
trading systems deploys a grey-box mechanism (Fig. 1). As
opposed to a completely automated black-box mechanism,
where the agent makes all the decision and the process is
virtually transparent, the client (the trader in this scenario)
is given mechanisms to veto a trade or propose a new one if
deemed necessary. Such actions, if not taken into account, may
harm the social welfare of the system, as strategies are now
not simply derived by agent, but also with human intervention.
With the above innovation, we present our theoretical frame-
work for human-centric mechanism design (HMD). One major
difference between HMD and conventional mechanism design
is that human are generally less rational than machines and
contains emotions, which violates the rationality assumption
in the ﬁrst place. In the case of automated trading, for example,
human also have a tendency to either settle too soon or hold
on too long. Nonetheless, machine makes decisions (and take
corresponding actions) in milliseconds, which is something
infeasible for human to do.
It is very difﬁcult, if not impossible, to model a hybrid
of human behavior and machine behavior using a single,
uniﬁed model. The bright side is, in a grey-box scenario,
most of the decisions are still made by the agents, and
human interventions appears only on critical situations. Our
design has taken into account serval of those situations, and
incorporated them into the overall mechanism design process.
Design considerations such as computational cost, stability,
and symmetry are particularly important in our framework,
and each challenge has been properly addressed.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented the need and our position on human-
centric mechanism design. In the design, we identiﬁed situ-
ations where human intervention impact social welfare, and
incorporated the design framework for peer-to-peer grey-box
systems.
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